Huwebes, Hunyo 16, 2016

People v Recto (2001) case digest

G.R. No. 129069            October 17, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
JULIO RECTO y ROBEA, appellant.

PANGANIBAN, J.:


FACTS:

RTC of Romblon found Julio Recto y Robea guilty of (1) two counts of the complex crime of qualified direct assault with frustrated homicide the complex crime of qualified direct assault with murder and (3) homicide. accused, with intent to kill, did by means of treachery attack, assault, and shoot with a shotgun locally called pugakang one MELCHOR RECTO, knowing that the latter is a duly appointed barangay chief tanod of Romblon, while he was engaged in the performance of his official duties, inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds in different parts of his body.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is guilty of direct assault.

HELD:

No. The trial court erred in convicting appellant of qualified direct assault with frustrated homicide
Direct assault may be committed in two ways: first, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition; and second, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties.

In the case at bar, the victim, Melchor Recto -- being then the barangay chief tanod of Ambulong, Magdiwang, Romblon -- was clearly an agent of a person in authority. However, contrary to the findings of the trial court, he was not engaged in the performance of his official duties at the time he was shot. Neither was he attacked on the occasion of such performance. Thus, the attack on him did not amount to direct assault appellants liability amounted only to attempted, not frustrated, homicide. The penalty that is lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for consummated homicide shall be imposed upon appellant. After applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, it shall be taken from the medium period, since there were no aggravating or mitigating circumstances proven.

In Criminal Case No. 1971, the trial court was correct in ruling that the attack on Percival Orbe then a barangay captain, a person in authority.


In his other criminal case, Considering that Antonio Macalipay was a kagawad who was in the actual performance of his duties when he was shot, the attack on him constituted direct assault. appellant should be held liable for the complex crime of qualified direct assault with homicide. The penalty to be imposed on him should be for homicide, which is the more serious crime, to be imposed in the maximum period.

Rivera v People (2005) case digest

G.R. No. 138553               June 30, 2005

ENRIQUE "TOTOY" RIVERA Y DE GUZMAN, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

GARCIA, J.


FACTS:

Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for review on certiorari are decisions convicting herein petitioner Enrique "Totoy" Rivera of the crime of direct assault, and denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

The accused did employ force and seriously resist one Lt. EDWARD M. LEYGO, knowing him to be a policeman, by then and there challenging the latter to a fistfight and grappling and hitting the said policeman on his face, thus injuring him in the process while the latter was actually engaged in the performance of his official duties.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not petitioner is guilty of direct assault.

HELD: 

Yes. Direct assault, a crime against public order, may be committed in two ways: first, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition; and second, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance.
Petitioner's case falls under the second mode, which is the more common form of assault and is aggravated when: (a) the assault is committed with a weapon; or (b) when the offender is a public officer or employee; or (c) when the offender lays hand upon a person in authority.

People v Beltran (1985) case digest

G.R. Nos. L-37168-69      September 13, 1985

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.

DELFINO BELTRAN, alias Minong, DOMINGO HERNANDEZ, alias Doming; CEFERINO BELTRAN, alias Ebing; MANUEL PUZON alias Noling; CRESENCIO SIAZON, alias Ising; and ROGELIO BUGARIN, alias Boy, accused-appellants.

RELOVA, J.:


FACTS:

Accused-appellants Delfino Beltran and others were indicted for murder and double attempted murder with direct assault evidence shows that in Ballesteros, Cagayan, Ernesto Alvarado was bringing Calixto Urbi home in a jeep. Passing by the Puzon Compound, Delfino Beltran shouted at them, "Oki ni inayo" (Vulva of your mother). 

They proceeded on their way and ignored Delfino. After Alvarado had brought Urbi to his house he went to the house of Mayor. The newly elected Mayor told the Chief of Police that something should be done about it.

When they came near the compound, they saw appellants and suddenly there was a simultaneous discharge of gunfire, The mayor's son, Vicente,  and Mayor also suffered injuries.

I: W/N appellants guilty of attempted murder with direct assault.

H: Yes. considering that Mayor Quirolgico is a person in authority and Pat. Rolando Tolentino is a policeman who at the time was in his uniform, and both were performing their official duties to maintain peace and order in the community, the finding of the trial court that appellants are guilty. For the double attempted murder with direct assault, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty imposed on the aforesaid appellants is reduced to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum.

People v Tac-an (1990) case digest

G.R. No. 76338-39            February 26, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.

RENATO TAC-AN Y HIPOS, accused-appellant.

FELICIANO, J.:


FACTS:

Accused Renato Tac-an appeals from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City, convicting him of qualified illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition. 

The above-named accused, while acting under the influence of drugs and without any license or permit from the proper authorities, did have ill his possession custody and control an unlicensed firearm, a SMITH & WESSON Airweight caliber .38 revolver and without any justifiable cause and with intent to kill, used the said firearm and ammunitions to shoot one Francis Ernest Escano III hitting and inflicting upon the latter the following gunshot wounds.

Appellant contends that he had voluntarily surrendered and that the trial court should have considered that mitigating circumstance in his favor.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not Renato's voluntary surrender warrant him a mitigating circumstance. 

HELD: 

No. Renato surrendered his gun, not himself, by handing over the weapon through the balustrade of the faculty room. Secondly, he surrendered the gun to his brother, who was not in any case a person in authority nor an agent of a person in authority. Thirdly, Renato did not surrender himself he was arrested by Capt. Lazo. The fact that he did not resist arrest, did not constitute voluntary surrender. Finally, if it be assumed that Renato had surrendered himself, such surrender cannot be regarded as voluntary and spontaneous. Renato was holed up in the faculty room, in effect holding some teachers and students as hostages. The faculty room was surrounded by Philippine Constabulary soldiers and there was no escape open to him.

People v Rodil (1981) case digest

G.R. No. L-35156               November 20, 1981

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FLORO RODIL defendant-appellant.

MAKASIAR, J.:


FACTS:

Accused Floro Rodil was found guilty for the death of Lt. Guillermo Masana of the Philippine Constabulary. The accused, armed with a double-bladed dagger, with evident premeditation and treachery, and with intent to kill, did, attack and stab PC Lt. Guillermo Masana while the latter was in the performance of his official duties, which directly caused his death.

ISSUE

Whether or not the crime of murder can be complexed with assault upon agent of authority.

HELD:

Yes. The Solicitor General claims the crime committed was murder because "it was established by the prosecution that during the stabbing incident, appellant suddenly and without giving the victim a chance to defend himself, stabbed the latter several times with a dagger, inflicting. The suddenness of the attack does not by itself suffice to support a finding of treachery , the record failed to show that the accused made any preparation to kill his victim so as to insure the commission of the crime. Clearly, therefore, the impelling motive for the attack by appellant on his victim was the latter's performance of official duty, which the former resented. This kind of evidence does not clearly show the presence of treachery in the commission of the crime.

The aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank should be appreciated because it is obvious that the victim. Identified himself as a PC officer to the accused who is merely a member of the Anti-Smuggling Unit and therefore inferior both in rank and social status to the victim. If the accused herein were charged with the complex crime of murder with assault against an agent of a person in authority, and not merely murder, then the aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank or contempt of or insult to public authority cannot be appreciated as aggravating because either circumstance is inherent in the charge of assault against a person in authority or an agent of a person in authority. 

But in the case at bar, the appellant is accused of murder only. Consequently, either aggravating circumstance should be considered in the imposition of the penalty. Appellant guilty of HOMICIDE AGGRAVATED BY CONTEMPT FOR OR INSULT TO A PUBLIC AUTHORITY OR DISREGARD OF THE RESPECT DUE THE OFFENDED PARTY ON ACCOUNT OF HIS RANK.

Martinez v Morfe (1972) case digest

G.R. No. L-34022 March 24, 1972

MANUEL MARTINEZ Y FESTIN petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE JESUS P. MORFE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, and THE CITY WARDEN OF MANILA, respondents.

G.R. Nos. L-34046-7         March 24, 1972

FERNANDO BAUTISTA, SR., petitioner,
vs.

HON. FRANCISCO MA. CHANCO, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet, Second Judicial District, Branch III, et al., respondents.

FERNANDO, J.


FACTS:

The question raised in these certiorari proceedings is the scope to be accorded the constitutional immunity of senators and representatives from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of Congress and in going to and returning from the same except in cases of treason, felony and breach of the peace.

Petitioners Manuel Martinez y Festin and Fernando Bautista, Sr., as delegate of the present Constitutional Convention would invoke what they consider to be the protection of the above constitutional provision, if considered in connection with Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code penalizing a public officer or employee who shall, during the sessions of Congress, "arrest or search any member thereof, except in case such member has committed a crime punishable under [such] Code by a penalty higher than prision mayor."

Both petitioners are facing criminal prosecutions, for falsification of a public document and for violation of the Revised Election Code.

The Solicitor General dispute such a contention on the ground that the constitutional provision does not cover any criminal prosecution being merely an exemption from arrest in civil cases, the logical inference being that insofar as a provision of the Revised Penal Code would expand such an immunity, it would be unconstitutional.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not senators should be immune from the criminal charges.

HELD:

No. As is made clear in Section 15 of Article VI of the Constitution, the immunity from arrest does not cover any prosecution for treason, felony and breach of the peace. Treason exists when the accused levies war against the Republic or adheres to its enemies giving them aid and comfort. Breach of the peace covers any offense whether defined by the Revised Penal Code or any special statute.

It is a well-settled principle in public law that the public peace must be maintained and any breach thereof renders one susceptible to prosecution. There is a full recognition of the necessity to have members of Congress, and likewise delegates to the Constitutional Convention, entitled to the utmost freedom to enable them to discharge their vital responsibilities.

When it comes to freedom from arrest, however, it would amount to the creation of a privileged class, without justification in reason, if notwithstanding their liability for a criminal offense, they would be considered immune during their attendance in Congress and in going to and returning from the same. There is likely to be no dissent from the proposition that a legislator or a delegate can perform his functions efficiently and well, without the need for any transgression of the criminal law. Should such an unfortunate event come to pass, he is to be treated like any other citizen considering that there is a strong public interest in seeing to it that crime should not go unpunished.